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This is a pre-review version of an article published in (2017) 1 European Journal of Health 
Law 67-84 
 
Developing a Legal Framework for Advance Healthcare Planning: Comparing 
England & Wales and Ireland 
 
Mary Donnelly, Law School, University College Cork, Ireland 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The facilitation of advance planning is widely recognised as a key element in an appropriate 
legal response to capacity impairment and the adoption of legal measures in this regard is 
formally recommended by the Council of Europe.1 A variety of legislative measures in 
respect of advance healthcare planning has emerged across Council of Europe Member 
States2 and it has become clear that the choice to introduce legislation is only one aspect of 
the legislative choices to be made. The more interesting questions relate to the detail of the 
measures adopted.   Choices made at this level reflect differing responses to the complex 
ethical and policy questions to which advance healthcare planning gives rise. In this respect, 
the Council of Europe Recommendation is largely non-directive, leaving the relevant choices 
to be made at member state level.3  
This article explore the choices made in two Council of Europe member states with 
common law traditions, both of which have relatively recently introduced legislative 
frameworks for advance healthcare planning.  In England and Wales, the relevant measure 
is the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) which came into effect on 1 October 2007 while, in 
Ireland, the legislation is the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (ADMA), which 
was signed in law on 30 December 2015 and is expected to come into effect in 2016.  
Notwithstanding a number of similarities between the MCA and the ADMA, some 
                                                          
1  Council of Europe, Principles concerning continuing powers of attorney and advance directives for 
incapacity, Recommendation CM/Rec(2009) 11.  
2  See D. Veshi and G. Neitzke, ‘Advance Directives in Some Western European Countries: A Legal and 
Ethical Comparison between Spain, France, Italy and Germany’, European Journal of Health Law 22(4) (2015) 
321-345; D. Veshi and G. Neitzke, ‘Living Wills in Italy: Ethical and Comparative Law Approaches’, European 
Journal of Health Law 22(1) (2015) 38-60; M. Navarro-Michel, ‘Advance Directives: The Spanish Perspective’, 
Medical Law Review 13(2)(2005) 137-169.  
3  See Principle 15.1: ‘States should decide to what extent advance directives should have binding 
effect’; Principle 16.2: ‘States should consider what other provisions and mechanisms may be required to 
ensure the validity and effectiveness of those advance directives’. 
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interesting variations may be identified, reflecting differences in approach to the underlying 
principles of autonomy and protection. This article undertakes a comparative exploration of  
each measure, both in terms of background and also in terms of the detail of the 
approaches taken. The article begins with a contextual exploration, identifying the 
normative choices to be made in legislating for advance healthcare planning and looking at 
how the task of legislating was approached in the jurisdictions examined, as well as the 
available information on the efficacy of the MCA. It then looks at the detail of the two 
measures, arguing that in several respects, possibly because the drafters were able to 
absorb lessons from established legislation in other jurisdictions, the ADMA provides a more 
rounded and complete form of advance healthcare planning than that provided by the MCA.    
 
2. Background and Context 
 
Legislative provision for advance directives and continuing/enduring powers of attorney has 
been a feature of the law in some states in the United States since the 1970s, becoming 
national policy there from the early 1990s4 and in various Australian jurisdictions5and New 
Zealand6 since the late 1990s.  European developments have been somewhat more recent, 
typically taking place after 2000.  
 
2.1 Identifying Ethical Complexities 
The advantage of advance healthcare planning is that it allows a person whose capacity is 
unimpaired some degree of control over future decisions, notwithstanding a subsequent 
significant impairment in capacity. For this reason, within legal frameworks which prioritise 
the principles of autonomy/self-determination, the normative value of advance healthcare 
planning is clear.7  However, where the normative framework is extended to include other 
values (such as dignity or welfare), the position becomes more complex. In broad terms, 
tensions arise where there is an apparent conflict between an advance decision made by a 
person with unimpaired capacity and a contemporaneous preference or welfare interest of 
a person whose capacity is impaired.8  The question is especially contentious in the context 
of advance healthcare planning, where the choice may be of life-or-death significance.    
The classic liberal view, espoused most famously by Ronald Dworkin, is that advance 
healthcare decisions made while a person’s capacity is unimpaired should be respected 
notwithstanding subsequent harm to the person’s interests (which Dworkin terms 
                                                          
4  Both forms of advance decision-making are a feature of the model law framework set out in the 
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act 1994. 
5  See e.g., Medical Treatment Act 1998 (Victoria) and Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Queensland). 
6  Code of Health and Disabilities Services Consumers’ Rights 1996. 
7  See the Preamble to CM/Rec(2009) 11. 
8  See generally, A. Maclean, ‘Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-Making’, Medical Law 
Review 14(3) (2004) 291-230; P. Lewis, ‘Medical Treatment of Dementia Patients at the End of Life: Can the 
Law Accommodate the Personal Identity and Welfare Problems’, European Journal of Health Law 13(3) (2006) 
219-234.  
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‘experiential interests’) when his or her capacity is impaired .9 Only in this way is the 
individual’s autonomy (sometimes described as ‘precedent autonomy’) respected.  The 
counter-argument is that advance and contemporaneous decisions cannot simply be 
equated in the manner Dworkin (and other supporters of this view10) assume. Allen 
Buchanan identifies three ethically significant differences between advance and 
contemporaneous decisions. First, even if the person is fully informed when making an 
advance decision, there may be subsequent developments in terms of treatment or 
prognosis which cannot be taken into account by the person at this time because they 
cannot be known. Secondly, the reasonable assumption that a person (without capacity 
impairment) is the best person to evaluate his or her own interests is less convincing where 
the evaluation relates to a radically changed situation (his or her life with significantly 
impaired capacity).11 Thirdly, important safeguards against imprudent decisions (such as 
advice/discussion/counselling), which are present in a contemporaneous situation, may not 
be present in an advance situation.12   
Clearly, the ethical significance of any of these factors will vary depending on 
context, e.g. a recent advance decision made in light of a specific conditions following 
careful thought and discussion with medical and other advisors will have considerably more 
ethical weight than an impulsive decision reached in a person’s distant past. Thus, 
Buchanan’s critique does not undermine the principle of advance decision-making. 
However, his argument (and those of other scholars with a broadly similar perspective13) is 
significant in drawing attention to the need for nuance in the legal framework around 
advance healthcare decision-making. The extent to which this is achieved depends on the 
detail of the framework employed and how the legislation balances values of autonomy/self 
determination on the one hand with values of welfare, dignity and life on the other.  
  
2.2 Legislating for Advance Healthcare Planning in England and Wales 
While the formal legislative framework for advance healthcare planning came into effect on 
1 October 2007, the enforceability of advance treatment refusals had been firmly 
established through the courts well before this.14  In terms of the balance between 
autonomy and other values, in the most detailed pre-MCA judicial consideration, Munby J. 
                                                          
9  Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom (New York: Aldred 
A Knopf, 1993), pp. 201-2. Dworkin contrasts a person’s experiential interests with his or her more morally 
significant ‘critical interests’ which relate to how s/he wishes to live his or her life.  
10  See e.g. N. Rhoden, ‘Litigating Life and Death’, Harvard Law Review 102(2) (1988) 375-446. 
11  A (more extreme) variant on this argument may be derived from Derek Parfit’s work on memory and 
psychological continuity: D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). Parfit argues that once 
psychological continuity is lost (as for example where a person loses his or her memory whether through 
dementia or otherwise), the person becomes, in essence, a different person to that which s/he was before.  
12  A. Buchanan, ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
17(4) (1988) 277-302. 
13  See e.g. R. Dresser, ‘Life, Death and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values 
in the Law’, Arizona Law Review 28(3) (1986) 373-405; S. Holm, ‘Autonomy, Authenticity or Best Interests: 
Everyday Decisionmaking and Persons with Dementia’, Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy 4(2) (2001) 153-
159. 
14  See e.g. Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290; Re AK (Medical Treatment: 
Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129. 
 4 
clearly favoured life over autonomy.  In HE v. A Hospital NHS Trust, 15 Munby J. operated on 
the basis of a presumption in favour of life and found that this presumption meant that, 
where a person’s life was at stake, clear and convincing proof must be provided that that 
advance refusal was valid and that it continued to apply in the circumstances arising.16   The 
effect of the presumption, as noted by Sabine Michalowski, was that, in life-sustaining 
situations, advance refusals of treatment were inherently unreliable.17  
 The MCA introduced two forms of advance healthcare planning, making provision for 
both advance refusals of treatment (referred to as ‘advance decisions’) and lasting powers 
of attorney (LPAs).  Almost ten years after the commencement of the MCA, it is clear that 
there has been limited uptake on the measures provided for. In respect of advance 
decisions, data cited to the House of Lords Select Committee review suggested a take-up 
rate of only 3 per cent of the public.  This was notwithstanding that 82 per cent of the public 
had indicated clear views about their end of life preferences.18 Concerns were also 
expressed to the Select Committee about the low levels of awareness among professionals 
about the role and status of advance decisions.19 Uptake on LPAs was somewhat higher but 
was still limited. Health and welfare LPAs made up a minority of registered LPAs, counting 
for only 20 per cent.20 Given the low uptake, it is unsurprising that there has been limited 
case law.  Judicial citations of the relevant measures have mostly been in a context in which 
they are of no relevance to the case in question either because such measures have not 
been put in place21 or because the patient was found to have lacked the capacity to make 
the advance decision.22 The House of Lords Select Committee make a number of 
recommendations to address the limited uptake, including increasing public awareness and 
improving professional understanding.23 However, they did not address a more fundamental 
question regarding whether the underlying legislative approach is optimal. This question will 
be explored further as part of the comparative analysis below.   
 
2.3 Legislating for Advance Healthcare Planning in Ireland  
The Irish courts had also recognised the enforceability of advance refusals of treatment at a 
level of principle prior to the enactment of the ADMA.24 However, jurisprudence was limited 
                                                          
15  [2003] EWHC 1017. 
16  Ibid., [24]. 
17  S. Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute 
Right’, Modern Law Review 68(6) (2005) 958-982. 
18  House of Lords Select Committee, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post Legislative Scrutiny (London: The 
Stationary Office, 2014), para. 193: these data were cited in a submission made by the organisation 
Compassion in Dying.  
19  Ibid., para. 195. 
20  Ibid., para. 179. 
21  See eg. W v. M and S and An NHS Primary Care Trust [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam); Re D [2012] EWCOP 
885.  
22  See A Local Authority v. E [2012] EWHC 1639; see R. Heywood, ‘Revisiting Advance Decision Making 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: A Tale of Mixed Messages’, Medical Law Review, 23(1) (2015) 81-102. 
23  Supra note 18, para. 200. 
24  See JM v. St Vincent’s Hospital [2003] 1 IR 321. 
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and these was a good deal of uncertainty regarding the scope and limits of the common law 
position.25  Moreover, although legislative provision had been made for enduring powers of 
attorney since the enactment of the Powers of Attorney Act 1996, the legislation did not 
extend to healthcare decisions.  This was because it was felt at the time of enactment that it 
could be politically risky to include healthcare decisions within the ambit of the legislation 
because of possible public concerns that such measures might facilitate euthanasia.   
The case for legislation addressing advance healthcare planning was made by the Irish 
Council for Bioethics26 and the Law Reform Commission of Ireland27 and public consultation 
in this regard was announced in February 2014.28 The measures were developed on a stand-
alone basis and then incorporated into the ADMA, which, like the MCA, provides the legal 
basis for most aspects of decision-making in circumstances of impaired capacity.  The 
introduction of advance healthcare planning was largely uncontroversial; in fact, the most 
contentious aspect of the proposals was the fact that the advance planning provisions did 
not go far enough because they excluded certain treatments for a mental disorder.29 
 
3. Provision for Advance Directives 
 
Advance directives (or ‘living wills’) are the quintessential mechanism for advance 
healthcare planning.  Both the MCA and the ADMA make provision for advance directives 
and both Acts allow this facility only to a person aged over the age of 18 years who has 
capacity.30  The standard for capacity is largely similar in both Acts31 and both Acts also 
include a requirement that a person is not be considered unable to make a decision on the 
grounds of incapacity unless all practicable steps have been taken to help him or her to do 
so, without success.32 The ADMA also allows for two formal mechanisms for the provision of 
decision-making support in the forms of assisted decision-making and co-decision-making.33  
                                                          
25  See M. Donnelly, ‘Patient-centred Dying: The Role of Law’, in: M. Donnelly and C. Murray (eds.) Ethical 
and Legal Debates in Irish Healthcare: Confronting Complexities (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2016), pp. 222-235.  
26  Irish Council for Bioethics, Is it Time for Advance Care Directives? (Dublin: ICB, 2007). 
27  Law Reform Commission, Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (Dublin: LRC 94,2009). See C. 
Staunton, ‘The Development of Healthcare Planning in Ireland’, Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 15(2) (2009) 
74-81.  
28  For summary of the 67 submissions made, see http://health.gov.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Overview-of-AHD-Public-Consultation-Submissions.pdf 
29  See text to n. 60 infra. This omission was raised by several Senators in the debates: see Seanad 
Debates 10 November 2015. 
30  MCA s. 24(1); ADMA s. 84(1). 
31  In both measures, capacity requires the ability to understand the information relevant to the decision; 
to retain that information; to use and weigh the information and to communicate the decision: MCA s. 3(1); 
ADMA s. 3(2).  On the application of the broadly similar common law standard for capacity to make an advance 
refusal, see The NHS Trust v. T [2004] EWHC 1279. 
32  MCA s. 1(3); ADMA s. 8(3). 
33   The development of measures for supported decision-making is a requirement under Art. 12(3) of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006, A/RES/61/106 (which has been 
ratified by the United Kingdom and signed but not yet ratified by Ireland, although there is a formal 
commitment to ratify).  
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Both mechanisms allow a person whose capacity is ‘or may shortly be in question’ to 
appoint someone to provide them with decision-making support to reach the standard for 
capacity.34  Therefore, an advance directive made with the support of either a decision-
making assistant or a co-decision maker would meet the capacity requirement.   
 
3.1  Scope of Measures 
The MCA applies to one type of decision only.  This is an advance decision to refuse 
treatment.35 Refusal may relate either to the carrying out or the continuation of treatment 
and may extend to ‘life-sustaining’ treatment, although designated formalities (discussed 
below) apply if it is to apply in this situation. No distinction is made between other types of 
treatment (other than treatment covered by the Mental Health Act 1983 discussed below).  
This leaves open the question of whether basic measures such as hygiene, warmth or other 
physical comforts would come within the definition of (refusable) treatment.  It is probable 
that, if the matter were considered by the courts, basic care of this kind would not be 
considered to fall within the definition. Even leaving aside the question of whether a 
contemporaneous refusal of basic care should be permitted,36 it may reasonably be argued 
that because of the ethically significant differences between contemporaneous and advance 
decisions discussed above,37  advance refusals of basic care should not be permitted.   
As under the MCA, under the ADMA a refusal of treatment must be complied with 
provided that the relevant conditions are met.38  However, the ADMA avoids uncertainty in 
respect of basic care, by including a clear statement that an advance refusal does not apply 
to the administration of this.39  ‘Basic care’ is defined as including (but not limited to) 
‘warmth, shelter, oral nutrition, oral hydration and hygiene measures’.40 Crucially, it does 
not include artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH).41  The differential treatment of oral and 
artificial nutrition and hydration reflects established Irish42 case law and Irish professional 
ethics guidance.43   It also reflects a broad ethical consensus that ANH is most appropriately 
                                                          
34  With assisted decision-making, the decision-making assistant assists the appointer in obtaining 
information and making a decision: ADMA s. 14; with co-decision-making, the co-decision-maker makes the 
decision jointly with the appointer: ADMA s. 19. 
35  MCA s. 24(1).   
36  Even within a resolutely autonomy-focussed approach, a feasible argument could be made that harm 
to others (other patients, healthcare professionals) should prevent a right to refuse basic care in at least some 
circumstances: e.g. the circumstances identified (in the context of a refusal of hygiene care) in D. Dudzinski, S. 
Shannon and R. Tong, ‘Competent Refusal of Nursing Care’, The Hastings Center Report 36(2) (2006) 14-15. 
37  See text preceding n. 12 supra.  
38  ADMA s. 84(2). 
39  ADMA s. 85(4)(a).  
40  ADMA s. 85(4)(b). 
41  ADMA s. 85(4)(b). 
42  In Re a Ward of Court [1996] 2 IR 79, the Supreme Court of Ireland treated the withdrawal of ANH no 
differently to the withdrawal of other forms of medical treatment. 
43  Medical Council, Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Professionals (2009) 
(available at https://www.medicalcouncil.ie/) para. 22.2 states that there is no obligation on a medical 
practitioner to start or continue ANH that is ‘futile or disproportionately burdensome, even if such treatment 
may prolong life.’  
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categorised as a form of medical treatment44 (although, as discussed below, medical 
treatment in respect of which particular ethical issues arise45).    
In focussing on refusal only, the MCA reflects the traditional ‘thin’ view of autonomy 
as simply a right to be left alone.46 In this, it reflects the long-established position at 
common law that requests for treatment are treated differently to refusals of treatment. 47 
This position was  affirmed by the England and Wales Court of Appeal in R (Burke) v. The 
General Medical Council and Others.48  Here, the Court dismissed the claimant’s argument 
that he should be able to make an advance binding request that ANH would continue to be 
provided in the event that he should subsequently lose the ability to communicate his 
wishes (he suffered from spino-cerebellar ataxia and this was a realistic prospect).  The 
Court was clear that a patient’s right to choose treatment was ‘in truth … no more than a 
reflection of the fact that it is the doctor’s duty to provide a treatment that he considers to 
be in the best interests of the patient and that the patient is prepared to accept’. 49  Instead 
the Court relied on the doctor’s duty of care, stating that, in respect of ANH, ‘[w]here ANH is 
necessary to keep the patient alive, the duty of care will normally require the doctors to 
supply ANH.’50 
The ADMA adopts a different approach.  Although it also distinguishes between 
refusal of treatment and requests for treatment, it allows greater scope for patient choice 
around requests.  Requests for treatment are not legally binding under the ADMA. However, 
they must be ‘taken into consideration’ during any subsequent decision-making process ‘if 
that specific treatment is relevant to the medical condition for which the directive-maker 
may require treatment’.51 If the request is not complied with, the healthcare professional 
concerned must record the reasons for not complying with the request in the directive-
maker’s notes and give a copy of these reasons to the person’s designated healthcare 
representative52 (if such an appointment has been made).53  
The ADMA approach represents a more nuanced response to requests for 
treatment. On the one hand, it reflects an important ethical difference between refusals of, 
and requests for, treatment.  As described by Jonathan Montgomery, the common law 
position is ‘characterised by the assumption that judges and healthcare professionals have 
complementary roles in a single integrated system for ensuring that healthcare is governed 
                                                          
44  See M. Ashby and B. Stoffell, ‘Artificial Hydration and Alimentation at the End of Life: A Reply to 
Craig’, Journal of Medical Ethics 21 (1995) 135-140. 
45  See H. Brody, L. Hermer, L. Scott, L. Grumbles, J. Kutac, S. McCammon, ‘Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration: The Evolution of Ethics, Evidence and Policy’, Journal of General Internal Medicine 26(9) (2011) 
1053-1058. 
46  See O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 37. 
47  See e.g. Re J (A Minor) (Child in Care: Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 15. 
48  [2005] EWCA Civ 1003. 
49  [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [51]. 
50  [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [32]. 
51  ADMA s. 84(3). 
52  This role is an innovative aspect of the ADMA and is discussed in text to n. 74 infra. 
53  ADMA s. 84(3)(b).  The reasons must be provided as soon as practicable and no later than 7 working 
days after they have been recorded. 
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by sound moral principles.’ 54  Requiring a healthcare professional to provide medical 
treatment which is contrary to his or her clinical judgement would represent a very 
substantial legal invasion into the domain of professional ethics.55  However, the MCA 
position can be criticised for failing to afford any degree of recognition of patient choice. 56  
Particular issues arise around situations, such as in Burke, involving the removal of ANH. As 
had been recognised by Munby J. in the High Court in Burke,57 the removal of ANH raises 
specific issues under the European Convention on Human Rights. Munby J. had concluded 
that, during the period while the patient was aware of his surroundings, the withdrawal of 
ANH would leave him exposed to ‘acute mental and physical suffering’ and would implicate 
his rights under Art. 2 (right to life); Art. 3 (protection from inhuman and degrading 
treatment) and Art. 8 (right to personal autonomy).58 Reliance on the professional duty of 
care in such circumstances provides inadequate protection for patient rights, offering a 
patient no mechanism whatever to ensure that his or her views can continue to be heard 
once s/he can no longer communicate.  
By affording patients the opportunity to record their views formally and requiring 
healthcare professionals to take account of these, the ADMA offers patients some degree of 
control (enhanced by the possibility of appointing a designated healthcare representative to 
whom the professional must account) without excessive intervention in clinical judgement 
regarding the appropriate delivery of care.  It will, of course, only be possible to judge how 
effective the legislation is in this regard when it has become operational.  Nonetheless, the 
approach taken in the ADMA offers potentially more substantive protection for patient 
autonomy and choice than the MCA/common law alternative.  
Notwithstanding that, in some ways, it offers more substantive protection for 
patient autonomy, there are two important limitations to the ADMA, both of which derive 
from the interaction between this legislation and other legal frameworks.  The first 
limitation is, in large part, shared with the MCA.  Both Acts allow advance refusals of 
treatment for a mental disorder to be over-ridden where the person who made the refusal 
has been made subject to the applicable mental health legislation.59 Under the ADMA, an 
advance healthcare directive must be complied with unless the Mental Health Act 2001 (or 
the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006) applies.60 The position under the MCA is largely similar 
except in respect of electro-convulsive therapy (ECT).  Following amendments introduced by 
the Mental Health Act 2007, a person may make an advance refusal of ECT notwithstanding 
that s/he is subject to compulsion under the Mental Health Act 1983.61  As with a 
                                                          
54  J. Montgomery, ‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’, Legal Studies 26(2) (2006) 185-210, at 204. 
55  See K. Manson and G. Laurie, ‘Personal Autonomy and the Right to Treatment’, Edinburgh Law Review 
9(1) (2004) 123-132. 
56  See C. Lemmens, ‘A New Style of End-of-Life Cases: A Patient’s Right to Demand Treatment or A 
Physician’s Right to Refuse Treatment? The Futility Debate Revisited’, European Journal of Health Law 20(2) 
(2013) 167-183 at 181.  
57  R (Burke) v. The General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin).  
58  Ibid, [171]. The position was different during the third stage (although Munby J. Ibid, [174] declined to 
reach a conclusion on the implications of this). 
59  Mental Health Act 1983 (EW); Mental Health Act 2001 (Ireland).  
60  ADMA s. 85(7).  
61  Mental Health Act 1983 s. 58A as inserted by Mental Health Act 2007 s. 27.    
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contemporaneous refusal of ECT, an advance refusal of ECT may be overridden where the 
treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life or is immediately necessary to 
prevent a serious deterioration in the patient’s condition.62   
It is increasingly recognised that the provision of mechanisms for advance care 
planning around mental health is important both as protection for patient rights and as part 
of an effective recovery process.63  For jurisdictions which have separate mental health and 
mental capacity laws, such mechanisms are generally provided within the context of mental 
health laws, not least because of the need to ensure some degree of consistency between 
the legal treatment of advance and contemporaneous decisions. On this basis, the absence 
of provision for advance mental health care planning within the ADMA is not unexpected. 
However, there is a strong case for amendment of mental health legislation to afford 
greater recognition to the potential of advance planning in the mental health context. 
The second limitation in the ADMA derives from the special protection afforded to 
the ‘right to life of the unborn’ under Art. 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.64 Given that 
the application of Art. 40.3.3 in the context of a contemporaneous refusal of treatment has 
not yet been resolved,65 the ADMA was limited in the choices it could make.  Thus, the 
ADMA states that, where the directive-maker is pregnant, and the advance directive does 
not specifically whether or not she intended a refusal of treatment to apply in such 
circumstances and the healthcare professional involved in her care considers that the 
refusal of treatment would have a deleterious effect on the unborn, there is a presumption 
that the treatment should be provided or not withdrawn.66 Where the advance directive 
specifically states that the refusal is to apply in cases of pregnancy, and the healthcare 
professional involved in her care considers that the refusal of treatment would have a 
deleterious effect on the unborn, the matter must be referred to the High Court to 
determine if the refusal should be unheld.67  In determining the application, the Court must 
consider the potential impact of the refusal on the unborn; the invasiveness and duration of 
                                                          
62  Mental Health Act 1983 s. 62(1A). 
63  See P. Weller, New Law and Ethics in Mental Health Advance Directives: The Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to Choose (Hove: Routledge, 2013); P. Weller, ‘Psychiatric Advance 
Directives and Human Rights’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 17 (2010) 218-229;  F. Morrissey, ‘Advance 
Directives in Mental Health Care: Hearing the Voice of the Mentally Ill’, Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland, 
16(1)(2010) 21-33. 
64  Although Art. 40.3.3 was intended to prevent the possibility of legalisation of abortion, either 
judicially or legislatively, the very broad wording has meant that the provision has had an impact well beyond 
the immediate matter of abortion e.g. the legal status of frozen embryos: Roche v. Roche [2010] IESC 10 and 
the withdrawal of life support from a brain-dead pregnant woman: PP v. Health Service Executive [2014] IEHC 
622. 
65  See K. Wade, ‘Refusal of Emergency Caesarean Section in Ireland: A Relational Approach’, Medical 
Law Review, 22(1) (2014) 1-25. In contrast, in England and Wales, it is clear that a contemporaneous 
(capacitous) refusal of treatment by a pregnant woman must be respected notwithstanding possible impact on 
the foetus:  St Georges Healthcare NHS Trust v. S [1998] 3 WLR 936. 
66  ADMA s. 6(a). 
67  ADMA s. 6(b). 
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the treatment and risk of harm to the directive-maker; and, any other matters the Court 
considers appropriate.68  
The advance refusal of (some) treatments by pregnant women gives rise to 
legitimate ethical questions.69  The ethically significant differences between 
contemporaneous and advance refusals discussed above are of particular relevance here.  
The possiblity of information deficit is accentuated in circumstances where a woman makes 
an advance refusal when she is not pregnant, unaware of how her views may be impacted 
upon by a subsequent pregnancy.  However, it may be counterargued that this approach 
second-guesses the decisions of women of child-bearing age, and accords too little respect 
to their moral agency. Ultimately, in the unlikely event of a conflict between foetal 
interests/life and a woman’s precedent autonomy, judicial consideration, as provided for in 
the ADMA, may be the most appropriate way of resolving the matter. The difficulty with the 
current constitutional position in Ireland is that any judicial consideration is inevitably 
weighted in favour of foetal interests rather than women’s autonomy. 
 
3.2  Giving Effect to the Advance Decision  
One of the difficulties with the MCA identified by the House of Lords Select Committee 
Review was the lack of mechanisms to ensure that the instructions provided in an advance 
decision were actually given effect in practice. The Select Committee cited evidence that, 
where an advance directive was in place, there was no ‘systematic process for the 
recording, storage and retrieval of this information’ when a decision came to be made.70  
The evidence also indicated that almost half of those who had made advance decisions has 
not shared this information with anyone else.71 The Select Committee also cited evidence 
from the England and Wales Law Society that, while medical professionals generally 
respected advance decisions which were valid and applicable, the difficulty usually arose in 
determining if this was the case.72 Delivery on advance directive has also been shown to be 
a problem in the United States where the extensive SUPPORT study carried out in the 1990s 
found that advance directives had almost no practical effect on the treatment which 
patients received towards the end of their lives.73 
                                                          
68  ADMA s. 6(c). 
69  On ethical issues in contemporaneous refusals, see generally R. Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: 
Law and Ethics of the Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
70  Select Committee Report n. 18, para. 197.  The Committee was citing the findings of the Advance 
Decision Evaluation (ADE) in Bipolar Disorder Study Team, Institute of Mental Health, University of 
Nottingham.   
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid., para. 198. 
73  See J.M. Teno, S. Licks, J. Lynn, N. Wenger, A.F. Connors Jr, R.S. Phillips, M.A. O'Connor, D.P. Murphy, 
W.J. Fulkerson, N. Desbiens, W,A. Knaus,  ‘Do advance directives provide instructions that direct care? 
SUPPORT Investigators. Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of 
Treatment’, The Journal of the American Geriatric Society 45(4) (1997) 508–12; J.M. Teno, M. Stevens, S. 
Spernak, J. Lynn, ‘Role of Written Advance Directives in Decision Making: Insights from Qualitative and 
Quantitative Data,’ Journal of General Internal Medicine 13(7) (1998) 439–46.  
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In contrast to the MCA, which makes no attempt to deal with the matter, the ADMA 
includes several measures to help ensure that effective is given to an advance directive. The 
most significant of these is the provision made for the appointment of a designated 
healthcare representative (DHR). A directive-maker may designate a person to act as DHR in 
the advance directive74 (subject to the agreement in writing of the DHR75) and the 
appointed DHR has the power to ensure that the terms of the advance directive are 
complied with.76 The directive may also confer on the DHR the power to advise and 
interpret the directive-maker’s will and preferences about treatment, including life-
sustaining treatment, based on the advance directive.77 This potential to empower a trusted 
person to deal with issues which may subsequently arise offers a richer and more integrated 
approach to advance healthcare planning than the simple written instruction allowed for in 
the MCA.78   
Of course, empowering a DHR, especially with regard to decisions concerning life and 
death, raises issues of protection and accountability.   In this regard, the ADMA requires 
that, where a DHR makes a decision in respect of the directive-maker, s/he must make and 
keep a record in writing and have this available for inspection by the Director of Decision 
Support Services (DDSS) 79 or the decision-maker if s/he has regained capacity.80 Complaints 
about the way a DHR is exercising his or her powers may be made to the DDSS and, 
following investigation of the complaint, the DDSS may make an application to court for an 
order preventing the DHR from exercising his or her powers.81  There is a risk that this level 
of formalisation of the process may make some people uncomfortable with agreeing to act 
as a DHR (particularly in a potentially fraught family situation). However, given the very 
significant powers afforded to a DHR, it is difficult to argue against the level of oversight 
employed. 
                                                          
74  ADMA s. 87(1)(a).  The ADMA contains a list of persons who cannot be appointed as DHR: s. 87(2) and 
circumstances in which a person who has been appointed ceases to be permitted to exercise relevant powers: 
s. 87(3) and s. 87(5) and 87(6).  In general, prohibitions relate to persons who have been convicted of a 
criminal offence in respect of the directive-maker/his or her children, or where a safety or barring order has 
been made in respect of the person, and to professional care-givers.  A DHR also ceases to have the relevant 
powers where s/he was the spouse/civil partner of the directive-maker and the marriage/civil partnership has 
been annulled or dissolved or the parties have judicially separated or have separated and ceased to cohabit for 
a continuous period of more than 12 months (unless the directive specifically provides otherwise). 
75  ADMA s. 87(1)(b).  The designated person must sign the directive to confirm his or her willingness to 
act in accordance with the known will and preference of the directive maker as determined by reference to the 
directive.  
76  ADMA s. 88(1)(a).  As described above, in text to n. 51, this operates differently in the context of 
requests for treatment. 
77  ADMA s. 88(1)(b). 
78  As discussed in the text to n. 109 infra, a person may appoint someone under an LPA who can make 
decisions for the appointer, including the giving or refusing of consent to the carrying out or continuation of 
life-sustaining treatment: MCA, s. 11(7)(c).  However, there is no integration between the two processes and 
the LPA is subject to any advance decision: s. 11(7)(b).      
79  The Office of DDSS is established under ADMA s. 94 and has a range of oversight functions in respect 
of the Act (s. 95).  
80  ADMA s. 88(3). Note also that provision is made for the possible development of a Code of Practice 
applicable to DHRs: ADMA s. 91(3). 
81  ADMA s. 88(5). 
 12 
A second measure to ensure delivery on the advance directive is the provision made 
in the ADMA for the (possible) introduction of ministerial regulations requiring the directive-
maker to inform the DDSS and other specified persons of the existence of the directive82 
and the imposition of a requirement on the DDSS to maintain a register of notified 
directives.83 This offers the potential for a formalised record and, presuming it is acted 
upon, should address some of the deficiencies identified by the House of Lords Select 
Committee in respect of the MCA.  
  
4. Enforceability of Advance Directives 
 
Conflicts between an advance directive and current preferences/best interests come to the 
fore in the context of questions regarding the enforceability of the advance directive. In 
striking an appropriate balance, the detail of two aspects of the legal framework are 
especially significant. These are the formalities and requirements for the creation of the 
advance directive and the statutory grounds on which the advance directive is deemed not 
to apply. Formalities provide a means to address ethical concerns regarding the absence of 
safeguards against imprudent decision-making at the time the advance directive is made.84  
The imposition of a requirement for consultation with a medical advisor at the time the 
directive is made would ensure that the directive is, to some degree, at least informed.85 
Thus, enhanced formalities/requirements may be seen to increase the ethical force of the 
advance directive and limit the grounds for subsequently invalidating the directive.  Of 
course, more stringent formalities/requirements also make the creation of an advance 
directive be more onerous and may reduce the accessibility of this mechanism for advance 
healthcare planning.  As will be seen below, the MCA adopted an approach based on fewer 
formalities but with significant potential for overriding the advance directive while the 
ADMA imposes more formalities but, correspondingly, allows the directive to be overridden 
in more limited circumstances.  
 
4.1  Formalities  
In terms of formalities required, the MCA differentiates on the basis of whether the advance 
decision concerns refusal of ‘life-sustaining treatment’. For decisions that do not involving 
life-sustaining treatment, there are essentially no formalities. Thus, there is no requirement 
that an advance decision must be in writing.86 Nor is there a need to use precise medical 
terminology: a decision may be regarded as specifying a treatment or circumstances even 
                                                          
82  ADMA s. 84(12)(a). 
83  ADMA s. 84(12)(b). 
84  See text to n. 12 supra. 
85  For a sceptical view of the value of the consultation in actually informing the patient, see A. Fagerlin 
and C. Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living Will’, Hastings Center Report, 34(2)(2004) 30-42. 
86  MCA s. 24(1). It is explicitly stated that neither a withdrawal nor an alteration of the decision need be 
in writing: MCA s. 24(4), (5). 
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though expressed in layman’s terms.87 For life-sustaining treatment, the refusal must be in 
writing; signed by the person making it or by another person at his or her direction; and 
signed and witnessed by one witness.88 The decision must also contain an explicit statement 
that it is to apply to the treatment in question even if life is at risk.89 One difficulty in this 
regard is that life-sustaining is defined as treatment which, in the view of a person providing 
healthcare for the person concerned, is necessary to sustain life.90 Thus, an advance directive may 
subsequently be classified as involving life-sustaining treatment and fail because it does not meet 
the relevant formalities.  
Clearly, the policy goal of the MCA was to make advance decisions accessible by 
minimising the formalities employed.  However, as the very low uptake on the facility 
indicates,91 this appears to have been largely ineffective. Moreover, as the decision in A 
Local Authority v. E92 shows, even with the greater formalities associated with an advance 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the lack of any requirement for formal capacity 
assessment at the time of making the decision leaves open the possibility of a subsequent 
finding that the person lacked capacity at this time.93  
 In contrast to the MCA, the ADMA adopts a formalised approach to all advance 
directives. An advance directive must be in writing94 and contain designated details.95 It 
must also be signed by the directive-maker.96 The directive-maker and the DHR (if any) must 
sign the advance directive in each other’s presence and in the presence of two witnesses.97  
Each witness must be over the age of 18 years and at least one witness must not be an 
‘immediate family member’ of the directive-maker.98  Any revocations or alterations of the 
directive must be made in writing and the alternation must be witnessed in the same way as 
an original advance directive.99  No additional formalities apply in respect of the refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment.  However, the directive will not be applicable to such treatment 
unless it includes a statement that it is to apply to the treatment in question even if the 
directive-maker’s life is at risk.100  This level of formality represents a very different 
                                                          
87  MCA s. 24(2). 
88  MCA s. 25(6). 
89  MCA s. 25(5). 
90  MCA s. 4(10). 
91  See text to n. 18 supra. 
92  [2012] EWHC 1639. 
93  See Heywood supra n. 22, 94. 
94  ADMA s. 84(4). 
95  ADMA s. 84(5). These include the name, date of birth and contact details of the directive-maker and 
of the DHR (if any). 
96  ADMA s. 84(5)(b). Someone may sign on behalf of the directive-maker but only if the directive-maker 
is unable to sign and the signature is completed in the presence of the directive-maker and at his or her 
direction. 
97  ADMA s. 84(6). 
98  ADMA s. 84(6). This is defined in ADMA s. 84(13) and extends quite broadly, including in-laws, aunts 
and uncles, and nephews and nieces.  
99  ADMA s. 84(7). 
100  ADMA s. 86(3). 
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approach to the MCA, although it notably does not include any requirement for consultation 
with a medical advisor.  
On the one hand, the more demanding approach in the ADMA risks creating 
obstacles to the creation of advance directives and may limit their adoption.  On the other 
hand, the more robust procedures help to ensure that people do not make advance 
directives lightly and that they may receive some degree of support around choices made 
(although a case may be made that the express support of a healthcare professional should 
have been required). Thus, they lend a greater degree of ethical conviction to the advance 
directive than the MCA model. This, in turn, is reflected in the rather different statutory 
approaches to the circumstances in which an advance directive may found not to apply.  
  
4.2   Grounds for Overriding 
Under the MCA, in order for an advance decision to be effective, it must be valid and 
applicable to the treatment.101 An advance decision is not valid if the person has withdrawn 
the decision while s/he had capacity to do so; if s/he has, under an LPA created after the 
advance decision, conferred authority on a donee to give/refuse consent in respect of 
treatment to which the advance decision relates; or, if s/he has done anything else clearly 
inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his or her fixed decision.102 The last of 
these limitations is the most contentious because there is no requirement that, for it to 
apply, the person’s capacity must be unimpaired.103 Moreover, the vague way in which the 
provision is stated leaves a good deal of discretion in an individual case. An advance decision 
is not applicable if the person who made the decision has capacity to give or refuse consent 
at the time; the treatment in question is not the treatment specified in the advance 
decision; any circumstances specified in the advance decision are absent; or, there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which the person making the 
decision did not anticipate at the time of the decision and which would have affected the 
decision if the person had anticipated them.104 This provision creates several difficulties. 
When combined with the lack of formalities required to make an advance decision, the 
requirement that treatment/circumstances must be specified may render an advance 
decision made in casual or informal circumstances unreliable and an oral advance directive 
close to pointless. In addition, the third limitation on applicability suggests a broad and 
open-ended potential for over-riding advance decisions. Overall, as described by Alasdair 
Maclean, the effect of the MCA requirements regarding validity and applicability means that 
advance directives are ‘vulnerable to challenge’ and this ‘undermines their value as 
protection for precedent autonomy.’105 
                                                          
101  MCA s. 25(1).  This is stated in negative terms: the advance decision does not affect the liability of a 
person carrying on the treatment unless the decision is valid and applicable to the treatment. 
102  MCA s. 25(2). 
103  See A. Maclean, ‘Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-Making’, Medical 
Law Review 16(1) (2008) 1-22, at 20 
104  MCA s. 25(4). 
105  Supra n. 103, at 16. 
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 The ADMA also requires that an advance directive be valid and applicable. However, 
the circumstances of invalidity/non-applicability are notably narrower than under the MCA.  
An advance directive is not valid if the directive-maker did not make the directive 
voluntarily;106 or s/he has done something clearly inconsistent with the relevant decision 
outlined in the directive.107 However, unlike the MCA, this can only happen where the 
person has capacity.  An advance directive is not applicable if, at the time in question, the 
directive-maker still has capacity to give or refuse consent to the treatment in question; the 
treatment in question is not materially the same as the specific treatment set out in the 
directive; or, at the time in question, the circumstances set out in the directive as to when 
the specific treatment is to be requested or refused are absent, or not materially the 
same.108  The concept of ‘materially the same’ allows more discretion to DHRs than the 
more constraining provision in the MCA.  Thus, the ADMA allows for more reliable advance 
healthcare planning.     
  
5 Powers of Attorney 
The creation of an enduring or lasting power of attorney (EPA/LPA) provides an alternative 
form of advance healthcare planning, enabling the donor to hand over decision-making 
authority to a trusted donee with effect if and when the donor loses capacity.  Although 
both the MCA and the ADMA allow for an EPA/LPA to be utilised for personal welfare 
decisions,109 which include some decisions about healthcare, these measures will more 
typically be utilised in respect of the donor’s ‘property and affairs’.   For this reason, the 
requirements for the creation of an EPA/LPA are more detailed and legalistic than for other 
forms of advance healthcare planning110 and these measures are unlikely to be used for 
healthcare planning alone.  
Under the MCA, a donee of a personal welfare LPA has the power to give or refuse 
consent to the carrying out or continuation of treatment.111 However, this power does not 
apply to life-sustaining treatment unless the instrument contains an express provision to 
this effect.112 The power is also subject to any advance decisions to refuse treatment113 and 
to any conditions or restrictions in the instrument creating the power. 114 Any decisions 
made by the donee of the LPA must be made in accordance with the best interests of the 
donor, as outlined in s. 4 of the MCA. This requires that, in making the decision, the donee 
must, insofar as is reasonably practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate as 
                                                          
106  Note also that it is a criminal offence to use fraud, coercion or undue influence to force another 
person to make, alter or revoke an advance healthcare directive: ADMA s. 90(1). 
107  ADMA s. 85(1). 
108  ADMA s. 85(2). 
109  MCA s. 9(1); ADMA s. 59(1). 
110  See MCA ss. 9-14 and Sch. 1; ADMA ss. 58-81, 
111  MCA s. 11(7)(c). 
112  MCA s. 11(8)(a). 
113  MCA s. 11(7)(b). 
114  MCA s. 11(8)(b). 
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far as possible in any act done for him or her and any decision made for him or her.115 In 
addition, the donee must consider insofar as is reasonably ascertainable, the donor’s past 
and present wishes and feelings and in particular any written statement made by the donor 
while s/he had capacity; the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence the donor if 
s/he had capacity; and the other factors that the donor would be likely to consider if s/he 
had capacity.116 Jo Samantha argues that the requirement to act on the basis of best 
interests, rather than on the basis of substituted judgment (what the donor would have 
wanted), serves as an inappropriate limitation on the effectiveness of LPAs in a healthcare 
context.117  This criticism does not recognise the extent to which the MCA best interests 
standard incorporates subjective elements into the traditional objective standard.118 
However, it is true that the effect of the application of the MCA best interests standard to 
LPAs means that the existence of an LPA does not absolutely guarantee that what the donor 
would have wanted will be done. 
The MCA presents further difficulties in cases where the LPA decision relates to life-
sustaining treatment.  This is because of the MCA requirement that, in considering whether 
the treatment is in the person’s best interests, the decision-maker must not be motivated 
by a desire to bring about the person’s death.119 As John Coggon has shown, this 
requirement is ‘wholly unworkable’120 because it focusses on motives for decisions rather 
than on the content of the decision itself.  In the context of an LPA, a literal reading of the 
requirement would suggest that a donee, who had been given clear authority to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and had been clearly told by the donor that he would wish to die in the 
circumstances arising would be prevented from making the decision to refuse if his 
motivation, based on an evaluation of the donor’s best interests, was to bring about the 
death of the donor.  Coggon argues that the requirement is a ‘sorry compromise’ with 
sanctity of life doctrine and that it ‘cannot be expected to apply in practice’.121 The 
requirement does not seem to have made an impact in judicial deliberations under the 
MCA. Nonetheless, the requirement creates unfortunate uncertainty regarding the 
operation of LPAs (as well other forms of best interest determinations) in respect of life-
sustaining treatment. 
The ADMA adopts a more extreme, albeit more certain, approach.  While a donor of 
an EPA can authorise the donee to make healthcare decisions, s/he cannot include a 
decision relating to refusal of life-sustaining treatment or a decision which is the subject of 
an advance healthcare directive.122  Thus, the only way in which one person may give 
                                                          
115  MCA s. 4(4). 
116  MCA s. 4(6).  
117  J. Samantha, ‘Lasting Powers of Attorney for Healthcare under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: 
Enhanced Prospective Self-Determination or a Simulacrum’, Medical Law Review 17(3)(2009) 377-409 at 409.  
118  See M. Donnelly, ‘Best Interests, Patient Participation and the Mental Capacity Act 2005’, Medical 
Law Review 17(1)(2009) 1-29 at 29. 
119  MCA s.  4(5). 
120  J. Coggon, ‘Ignoring the Moral and Intellectual Shape of the Law after Bland: The Unintended Side-
Effect of a Sorry Compromise’, Legal Studies 27(1)(2007) 110-125 at 119. 
121  Ibid., 125. 
122  ADMA s. 62(5). 
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another the power to refuse life-sustaining treatment is through the DHR mechanism in an 
advance directive.123 While this adds an additional administrative burden for a person 
engaged in advance healthcare planning within a broader advance planning process, this 
burden should not be significant. There is nothing in the ADMA to prevent the same person 
being the donne of an EPA and a DHR. Thus, there would simply be one additional (and 
relatively straightforward) form to be completed. The advantage of the ADMA approach is 
that it provides much clearer grounding for the decision to remove life-sustaining treatment 
and, unlike the MCA, grounds this authority in the stated preferences of the person lacking 
capacity.   
 
6 Conclusion  
 
The development of an appropriate legal framework to address situations of significantly 
impaired capacity is a human rights imperative.124 Making legal provision for advance 
healthcare planning is a necessary component of such a framework although it is also 
important to recognise that it can only represent one part of an appropriate framework.  
Individuals’ uptake on the option provided by advance healthcare planning is always likely 
to be limited.  This may be seen in the United States, where advance healthcare legislation 
has been in place for over 20 years and there is a specific statutory obligation on most care 
facilities to draw attention to the mechanism.125  Although there are no definitive overall 
statistics, evidence from various studies suggests the uptake ranges from as low as 7 per 
cent of patients in general practice 126 to a high of 88 per cent of patients discharged from a 
hospice.127 Studies indicate a range of reasons for the limited uptake among general 
patients.128 Some reasons, such as lack of knowledge among the public and healthcare 
providers or healthcare providers’ reluctance to discuss the issue can be addressed129 
(although, given the limited success of various US initiatives, evidently not easily).  Other 
                                                          
123  See text to n. 74 supra. 
124  In a Council of Europe context, the human rights imperative derives from the European Convention 
on Human Rights as well as from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (for 
those States which have ratified). 
125  Under the Patient Self-Determination Act 1990.  
126  L. Emanuel, M. Barry, J. Stoeckle, L. Ettelson, E. Emanuel, ‘Advance Directives for Medical Care: A Care 
for Greater Use’, New England Journal of Medicine 324(13) (1991) 889-895. See also SW Salmond and E. David, 
‘Attitudes towards Advance Directives and Advance Directive Completion Rates’, Orthop Nurs 24(2) (2005) 
117-127 found 25 per cent of people has completed advance directives; United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2008, Advance Directives and Advance Care Planning: Report to Congress. Retrieved 9 
February 2016, https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75811/ADCongRpt.pdf  reported an extensive 
range of studies showing that completion rates for advance directives among Americans were 18-36 per cent. 
127  A. Jones,  A. Moss, L. Harris-Kojetin, 2011, ‘Use of Advance Directives in Long Term Care Populations’,  
United States National Centre for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief 54. Retrieved 9 February 2016, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db54.pdf.  This may be contrasted with 65 per cent of nursing 
home residents and 28 per cent of home healthcare patients. 
128  See R. Johnson, Z. Yanfang, L. Kristin Newby, C. Granger, B. Granger, ‘Reasons for Non-completion of 
Advance Directives in a Cardiac Intensive Care Unit’, American Journal of Critical Care 21(5) (2012) 311-320. 
129  For one proposal using a computer decision-aid, see B. Levi and M.Green, ‘To Soon to Give Up? Re-
examining the Value of Advance Directives’, American Journal of Bioethics 10(4) (2010) 3-22.  
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reasons, however, are an inevitable part of human nature.  Many people will not make 
advance plans, whether through a reluctance to confront their own mortality or because 
they do not consider this kind of planning to be appropriate130. For some people too, the 
potential for advance healthcare planning may be limited because they have a cognitive or 
intellectual impairment which limits their capacity to make such plans (although 
developments in supported decision-making131 may expand the cohort of people for whom 
this kind of advance planning is possible). Acknowledging that advance healthcare planning 
may not be for everyone is important in developing a legal framework. It suggests that the 
aim of a legal framework should not be to achieve universal or even very extensive uptake 
but rather that the facility available to those who wish to utilise it should be robust.  
The comparison undertaken in this articles indicates that, in most respects, the 
ADMA offers a more nuanced and defensible form of advance healthcare planning than that 
offered by the MCA.  There is more protection for patient choice; the inclusion of the facility 
to appoint a DHR offers more potential for ensuring that healthcare providers actually 
deliver on the choices made; and the balance between formalities and enforceability 
delivers a more robust instrument.  Of course, the analysis that has been undertaken of the 
ADMA is inevitably textual; it is only when the legislative model is actually given effect in 
practice that a comprehensive evaluation of the legislative choices made can be 
undertaken.  More generally, the comparative analysis undertaken in this article makes clear 
that frameworks for advance healthcare planning must be evaluated at a level of detail 
because only in this context can the important choices made be identified. This kind of 
evaluation, and re-evaluation, is essential if this part of the important goal of providing 
appropriate legal frameworks for capacity impairment is to be realised.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130  In this respect, there seem to be clear cultural and race differences, with United States studies 
showing much less enthusiasm for advance directives among African Americans and suggesting incompatibility 
with traditions and cultures of Hispanic, Asian and Native Americans: see US Department of Health and Human 
Services Report to Congress supra n. 126 at 15. 
131  See text to n. 34 supra. 
